onsdag 30 december 2020

Obituary Over A Decade (measurements!)

The second decade - not to be mingled with the 2020s, which saw a close still under the ever-potent and yet strangely normal aegis of Trumpdom - since the last centennial (the "zeroth" not being an option) now coming towards a close has indeed, and perhaps since before halftime, been commended, if not lauded, and epitomised as that which saw the break of seeming victories of the great undisputed twentieth century. And if that pessimism is to stand any merit, we must reflex over where we are now as opposed to late 1920, or the early 1920s, just as much as the early 2010s. In the early 2010s (that is, early 2010) I was myself under the tutelage of high school, or gymnasium as we call it (without the Germanic capital "G"), and for all its bondage it was a pleasant time; not so much for the presence of choices made, as the absence of the foolishness of my own, and the very compact presence of my time and my own thoughts on how to use it. But I am a foul man, and full of vice, and just as capable of sniffing out the Zeitgeist as the Geists in human skin doing most of the speaking, and in the worst of times the thinking, for us. 

I say this only to draw parallells, in the plural sense, to the seeming fate of the world, by which we would expect to mean the Western world, or what was previously the "free" world. For in a way not un-akin to I myself discovering myself not very free, compared to my eighteen- or nineteen-year self, I have noted not only the relative freedom and liberty of the non-Occident (if not exactly of the classical Orient) which anybody with eyes had minded, but moreover the bondage, restrictions, real perils and relative authoritarianism of the free world, both in reality and in potentia. Our democracy, and by now I am not exactly alone to say this, rests at a proverbial knife's edge, balanced only by some knives' edges held and reflected in a sense of virtue, and immediately and suddenly imperilled by those wielded by vice, or at least eager self-interest. 

The difference, and thus difference across this decade, is 

In late 1920, we were not so certain of this triumph of democracy, of course. We had, in Sweden, already passed - through an already democratic, at least in the sense of the revolutionaries of 1688, or 1832, assembly assembled mainly from the ideas of 1789 (the American 1789, not the French, mind you) through the most debate-laden and peaceful parliamentary procedure - the vote for women, and just before that for men, including in the electorate for the more, or until now more prestige-cloaked "first" chamber. In Germany, parliamentary liberalism had triumphed over the continent's supposedly premier authoritarian power. 

But in 2010, how sure were we not of all those things? Nobody would in 2010 have come to question the great German democracy, nor the great experiment in how one, far from the Anglo-Saxon waving fists and shouts of procedural trickery and hecklerism, whether parliamentary or congressional, could adjoint a government of red and black into a synthesis of permanent-democratism. This "democratism", or so I believe, hold the key to much of the frustration against it, for as much as representative democracy is not democratic, in the classical sense it would permit the electorate to actually rule themselves - and would never, not even in the very liberal powers which now embody it - 

How then are we to cheer or reckon this 2010s? Well first, through recognising the limitations of this democracy - or at least of this "democratism" and of liberal, representative systems - both in its appeal and security of persistence in the Arab world and elsewhere where it has not ever or seriously broken through, the Chinese-Confucian for instance, 

måndag 7 december 2020

Obituary over the Undying

King of Clubs, Deputy of the Green Swastika, Commander of the Black Banner. Many titles could have been heaved upon him, and given his long and tumultuous history, he would hardly have eschewed any of them, with a smile already both charming and repugnant. In the long, strangely proud tradition of declaring dead those who still (or already, if we are to countenance actual resurrection) are able to complain about it, perhaps no man have eluded the tendency, or rather the explicit desire to bury in ink as well as dirt more than Izzat Ibrahim. Saddam's Queen regnant, and wise and tacit enough to elude, then as now, his many Henryesque purges.  

At 26 years and two weeks, he participated in the "glorious revolution", taking place in the July so prone to revolutions, including the memorable and recent 14 July (not the one you think about) establishing Arab nationalism outside, or alongside its blossom in great Misr, as well as eliminating the British holdfast in the heart of the old Caliphate and far older Mesopotamian cradle. But in fulfilling the promise made by Qasem's 1958 uprising, not only against a flawed and schizophrenic Hashemite monarchy but against disorder and revolution itself, its progeny would carry the promise of Ba'ath to fruition as a perfectly ordered police state, including a throbbing collision with its only twin and neighbour, the Alawite Assad-Ba'athist monarchy. For 35 years it would last, and Izzat Ibrahim would, strangely, follow it from the start to beyond its death throbs, including that very violent one christening itself the Dawlah al-Islamiyyah. Caliph he would never be, nor President, nor would he have wanted either, but in that small embodiment of power in the shadows, the shoulder beckoning between the head and the arm, always faithful, juxtaposing his quiet persona with a formidable presence in the ever-changing inner circle of the burgeoning Hussein dictatorship. After the bloody 1979 takeover, he just as quietly assumed the Vice Presidency the new ruler had left empty, and conjoined his obvious ambitions as Saddam's Dauphin to actual mingling of blood by marrying his daughter, one of an alleged 13, to the infamous Uday. Which of the bride's closest two men would have assumed power, if a third could not be produced and grow to maturity, we shall not know now, that the benefactor fell before his, in Tony Benn's and Jacques Chirac's view and, maybe, god's, time. Izzat would, perhaps the most remarkable (and on a personal level surely exhilerating) feat of the long and brutal dictatorship that took cue from its bloody inauguration - if one counts the takeover of July, yet again, 1979, that is - by compelling a divorce from the dictator in the wings by order of the current one. In this, perhaps, he also demonstrated an affection for his own blood which, typically for the Arab tribalist bonds that survive even the most strident and terroristic institutions of the regime, and perhaps fatherly affections as well. It was a suggestion that few would have dared. And seemed only the more respected and irreplacable for it.  

The steward walking unhesitantly, already moving past the leader.  

 

For the long, painful and glorious years that was liberated Iraq, he presided over a growing economy, a rapid expansion of the military, and eight long - and, again, dangerous not the least to those in positions of command - years of challenging the rivalling beacon, in many ways its supposed antithesis, in Persia, followed by an impossibly even more audacious challenge of its two main benefactors, King Fahd's Saudi Arabia and Bush's United States. And endured, at some point, what had just as likely been a death sentence by means of leukemia. A position in the highest ranks of the green would have allowed professional medical care, but Izzat hedged his bets by travelling to the European Union to ascertain treatments at a clinic in Vienna, avoiding arrest for the many war crimes piled up in the shadow of his master. Yet again, the grim face with the more eye-stealing moustache seemed to endure in its everlasting laughter.  

With the dusk of the Ba'athist regime, his would wait for another two decades, or very nearly so. The invasion of 2003 that toppled the government, Izzat went into hiding like his boss, and fellow Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, both executed in four years' time. And Izzat remained nowhere to be found. Due to his aged and always seemingly frail state, one might have expected him to be dead, or else in exile. But Izzat was not one to run, and his equally undying loyalty to the now very dead and deplored Saddam was expressed in the proclamation of his rise to national secretary of the party endured. As the merger of the Ba'athist regime, now a measly and outlawed party, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organisation, controversially present before the 2003 invasion (and thus by presidential fiat), soon an approved affiliate with the franchise-prone al-Qa'ida hawk whose shadow had supposedly legitimised the intervention, would soon make its presence known, under the brand of Islamic State of Iraq. Of all the top names testifying of the Ba'athist-Sunni blessing, or reconstitution, of the regime into a radical, populist, openly terroristic (without the prefix "state") organisation bent on establishing an actual Islamic State in Iraq, it was yet again in the shadow of civil infighting between Shi'ah and Sunni factions and the supposedly global Jihadi threat.  

Wrongful death. Of all the obituaries written over the dead, from Robert Graves to Ernest Hemingway to Christopher Hitchens, few have gained such notoriety - domestically, at least - and irony as the carrying to the final rest, a very restless procession, of the body of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri in April 2015. The Vice President of the regime now gone would not rest long before appearing to proclaim the premature nature of his demise.  

 

Arising as a very concrete and provincial power, and bent on - in some sense - resurrecting the Saddam regime, if not Al-Ba'ath, in its latest and most miserable incarnation, paranoid and prone to incorporate the latest Islamist and openly Jihadi trends in its secular law, formerly praised by zealous Westerners as embodiments of the alternative to repressive colonial and hibernated traditionalist dogma. Where the Ba'athists had proclaimed, more or less piously, lashings and brandings and amputations and beheadings, for the corrupt (not currently in favour), the promiscuous (likewise), the stealing (again...) and so forth, the new Islamist brand would practice its new-old creed through a lense of icily serious theology, killing and otherwise doling out justice before recognised in name as a state. For its breakthrough in Iraq, whereas its rise in Syria had been shielded by an optical pad of civil war, liberation and general chaos, he was instrumental in forging together tribes and veterans and criminals and business interests joined only by a common defiance of an evermore aggressive, near-genocidal Shi'ite-dominated conglomerate in Baghdad. From this common denominator of vindicated and besieged Sunnidom, a common formula was reached, and proved strong enough to vanquish the highly financed, and highly ineffective armed forces of Iraq now left to its own, now mainly proverbial, defences.  

A paragon of times seemingly gone. Yet the two forces he steered, never really recognised but unforgotten, may yet test the turbulent times that reigned before and after him.  

 

In all this, Izzat Ibrahim, the Devil's actual deputy for 40 years, continued for another eighteen summers in his waining twilight years, and grew into a man of his own making long before entering the stage as the chairman of this force which - bar his competitor in Syria, which at that point had died, replaced by a sordid, last-minute Dauphin by now reduced to tragedy and humiliation in his triumph - had once been assumed as the future of the Arab world, a face perhaps further away from Nasser's than any man. Yet, Izzat's face, that of the Undying, would live long after carried in a glass box to cheering crowds, to a quiet and barely even forgotten announcement five years before his already long-expected demise, perhaps represented Babylonia and its British-made current construct of Iraq itself; a cobbled construct, quiet and small, unassuming but able to punch well above his weight; his final years were ultimately as tragic as any of his age in such times, but he refused assuming the cloak of complete obscurity even as the entire world around surmised it. His hand helped guide Iraq throughout the entire Ba'athist epoch and well beyond it, transcending the supposed, equally false and cobbled divide between Ba'athist Islamist hand-and-head-chopping "secularism" in place in the early 2000s and the violent, supposedly Salafi-Jihadi but equally Sunni Arab identitarian movement we yesterday talked about as if it were the prime geopolitical foe of the day. Being a paragon of these two spent forces, he may represent the most pathetic and wasted in a man of supreme intelligence, sublime intrigue for which his tribe was never particularly known, and survival in a world where those who could save the day, it may seem, are already dead.

onsdag 2 december 2020

The Emperor of the Fifth Republic

His life, as the poet said, must not be measured by its worth; for then, it hath no end. This repeated catchphrase may not be one associated with the late, very belated Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the third man to serve as president during the fifth republic and captain of its empire and nuclear arsenal (sorry, Alain Poher, but you would go on to serve as the effectual dauphin in the shadows until 1992). But among the gallery of exciting men (sorry, Ségolène, though by your husband's merits you might not regret losing at the moment) he might be the most impressive, 

He arose to this most supreme office in a very narrow pushback - if yet the last - against the leftist incursion ringing its battle cry over France since the spring of 1968. But this was, as would later be apparent, a mere icing on the cake or a plateau on, or beneath, a series of careers in the service of the French magistracy and political administration emerging out of the revolution. At his birth, in Koblenz in then-occupied Ruhr, the Third Republic was into its second half-century, yet hardly measurably on the ropes. The Pyrrhic victory of the great war was felt, however, thus its 

I am convinced he was the greatest to hold the office, maybe since Adolphe Thiers,