måndag 31 december 2018

Warren - Vox Populi, Vox Americae Que Futurum


The Democratic senator and well-experienced lawyer from Massachusetts, progressive darling and scion of the Sanders camp, Elizabeth Warren, crowned the end of this two-year hiatus of Trumphood by announcing - well in time - her 2020 candidacy for the party's nomination, the first to sally forth to make democracy safe again for the Democrats, and rekindle the trust of the people on which it supposedly lays and whose allegiance to it has so many times been denounced, declared dead, and risen.


Empress Warren? 

The announcement is interesting, from several angles. Senator Warren, recently re-elected with a remarkable margin, while sharing the quality of (questionable) radical opposition that is womanhood with the 2016 nominee, a woman of merit, vigour, discoursive - verging on demagogic - quality as well as - this time genuine - passion, she is a stalwart progressive of the Northeastern but nonetheless decisively 2010s brand, a "Sandersista" without Sanders, as well as reassuringly (if, at 71 on election day, not remarkably) younger than his own eminence of the green mountain state. While it is true that Massachusetts may serve a poor bulwark of a nation-reaching campaign, with her background evoking a Northeastern liberal elitist bulwark only too fit not only for counter-attack but a better one than could be evoked by the Orange King's own mouth, the unification of the seemingly disparate strengths of the 2016 primary in one candidate is certainly stunning, and more importantly will seem thus to their - hopefully less managed - successors in the spring after next.

The forces rallying behind her will be just as interesting as those sure to be opposed, which may number many more still than the GOP hopefuls to emerge in the shame-lit and chaos-branded twilight days of the bleeding Obama administration. In our first taste, we see - presuming an implausible and democratically deficient smooth sally through to the convention - a confirmation fit for Bannon's prophecy (and praise) with left-wing populism, facing consolidated Trumpist protectionism and populist nationalism on the right, the argument of crony capitalism blazoned by a convinced and tested foe of some of its most ardent scions. With a flair of identitarian appeal to minorities and "(unity in?) diversity", the message is clearly in the Sanders' mold - promising wealth and a less toiling burden for working and middle class Americans, a fairness in the American promise, with more than a dash of national pride, American exceptionalism and optimist flair which, in the words of Khaled Hosseini, "that has made her [America] so great". An America yet to be considered great, one might say, to confound the businessman-prophet of doom.


A mother's glance; modest, calm and serene, back in the days of Woodstock, of Nixon and of a nation - and party - deeply and bitterly divided. Could it be that of a mother of a Mater Patriae, also?

This is, at least in the most extensive and fatigued sense of the term, quite innovative. If one foregoes the associations of the term, Senator Warren has been a maverick as much as a radical, championing regulation and justice with the same flair that she prosecuted some of its most audacious transgressors before (sadly not, one may only sigh, her presumed predecessor as the Democratic nominee). Whereas others have capitalised on typical movements, slogans and hashtags of the time, she remains as fiercely aggressive as independent, as much a preacher of a quasi-Marxist mold as schoolteacher, one who can - like her predecessor, if not adversary - say honestly she did indulge elsewhere before deciding to run for the body, despite auspicious academic achievements.

And there's the Pocahontas factor. Whereas the president was, quite justly, rebuked for rebuke of her playing the card of authentic racial residue, there can hardly be many conviction who took her rhetorical lash for anything more than opportunistic and an attempt to capitalise on that which is inherently against the concept of a state of many nations but no sectarian pride, a play of victimhood by one owning a seat in the Chambre des Pairs. But look again, and you'll notice the ethnic factor as presented in a nearly Marxist mold, subservient to the issue of class politics, of redistributing to (the story ever told) the good feelings and great expectations of the mid-20th century, possibly without treading too heavily on the embers of globalist capitalism and the price of transgressing it. This is good. This is - now I must've broken it - innovative, or would be were it the object and parcel of an administration. It is, in some sense, a reinvention of the Democratic brand for a decidedly post-Clinton age - no matter how many editors will sordidly rekindle their slogans of four years past, and call it backlash, the banker's darling avenged by the watchdog of integrity. And it is a good case for the enlightened patrician tradition of New England liberals, now reinvented and given a populist mold (again, to fit the hopes of Mr. Bannon).


The true Jackson? Andrew, then unspeakably old and disgustingly dangerous, the last born under British rule, a dangerous populist and demagogue, presumed and declared foreboder of the Trump persona. But is his legacy not more truly evoked by the populist brand of the party he helped to constitute? Sanders' and Warren's image is - as of yet - one of constitutionalism and moderation, of upholding liberal democracy rather than unhampered strongmanship. But in kindling a tempest of its own huddled masses, yearning more than being free, and in antagonising rather than cozying up to financial interests, are they not more worthy of the jackass?

Then what of the others? Well, in a crowded field it will be down to digits and unpredictable upsets on who splits which state in which manner (the ostensibly more progressive proportional system nonwithstanding, the 2016 primary left many things to be said regarding the democratic integrity of the process, whereas the "impossible" candidate out of 17 secured a neat 45 % of the vote) but it will be safe to say that Sanders, out for this reason I think more than any other, will affect it severely, should he follow the call of the throng, and stand once more. But the same is true, and thus redeeming, in the camp that - whatever its name - will not be branded progressive. Amongst a growing field of the new and the nuanced if not the best and the the bright, and a rather unsavoury (in this following the ethos of the 2016 race on the other side of the fence) emphasis on "unexperience" and being unscathed and untainted by established political process, on the new and even unelectable as the foremost, she stands out as one of the better fitted in both terms of radical message and a substantial persona of both integrity and independence, of ubiquity over the unctuous. Whereas Senator Gillibrand has a few more years of upkeep in the north wing, and several to that on the southern side, it is clear it will not be a great asset. Her voting record (you guess who) sports few drastic statements, she nevertheless blasts a record of integrity and independence, a turret against corruption, the lobbycracy and strict "unipartisanism". All this is refreshing.


The first of her gender. But she would also be, bar her presumed contender, the oldest to be first elected, and perhaps more amenable to a constituency further beyond the magic bar of 65, whose imbued privilege she would be presumed to defend... and in the end, perhaps, abandon in the name of sustainability.

With all this said Senator Warren, the first to announce - two months before the point Obama did in 2007 - has a substantial potency and a potential to be expected rather than discounted. But can she win on the real Tuesday, presuming the most beneficial competition in the spring? I am rather certain of this possibility, although there are several factors working against her. Whereas the gender issue has been mentioned - and should be held to the question of her even emerging as the nominee without it; ultimately a fair observation, I must say - the far more pressing concern is the unstated, repressed but ultimately odious brand of "Massachusetts liberal". Whereas this is unlikely to serve as a bastion of an ideally revitalised, broad Medicare-for-all, affordable college and housing, pacifict Democratic movement, it will very likely fly in the face of moderate voters. But does this matter, in light of the median voter case being sordidly torpedoed not only by Alan Lichtman but ultimately the electorate (well, where it mattered) two years ago? Yes, and no. Just as foreign borders have become more floating, domestic ones serve less the purpose they did at the time of the founding of the union, the senator herself being - infamously - a child of Okie, to little resentment for the average Massachusetts man. It will ultimately depend on the program, and whether a broad-based movement can be mustered. In this, she will serve a far more central role than any Clinton could, or Tim Kaine or Joe Biden, but stop be short before accepting Warren as better than Sherrod Brown, or - indeed - even Beto. But this brand could also be evoked by Biden, or Harris - or my unsung favourite, the Brown of the west - or anyone else of a record not in line with a brand of working-class welfare-state warfare.

The Foremost of the Five


The New Year's Eve now emerging poses no particular question with regards to the closing of centuries, or even decades, but does remind me of a question posed since several years. Six years past, I put forwards five presidents, including Jefferson, Cleveland, Roosevelt, Coolidge and Kennedy, suggested as the best among the 44 men (now 44 indeed, and all still men) to have occupied the office. I have tried and trussed with regards to the "five greatest" of personalities of the 20th century, speaking solely in terms of affirmed individual influence... good or bad.

The selection has not been an easy one. I had to forgo, most notably given the gender quota (predictable but perhaps not so draconian, in the great century of emancipation) Florence Nightingale and the bulwark of the suffragettes, whose struggle took flight in the late 19th century, harkening back to the Seneca Falls convention in 1848; a different wave, another revolution in another century. Yet, beyond the realm of the strictly political - to which only a minority belongs, and many highly expected have been excluded - there is at least one illustrious whose legacy cannot be but recognised.


Henry Ford (1863-1947)



Innovator of innovators, the first marksman of the 20th century of unexpected, pervasive, inexorable targets, and perhaps the greatest in altering its physical shapes and our day-to-day routines. His example have set the model, his tactics were renowned and bold past the line of insanity, and his antics brought controversy and pure disdain well beyond eccentricity. Quite rightly so, if one would only consider his fate in our light, had the great ideological struggles of the interwar period turned out very differently, and not vainly rocked itself against the American exceptionalism (and isolationism) seemingly so unassailable.

In the great struggles of the late century, which would escalate into the next, he was an innovator of roads Rockefeller would not have foreseen, and combined an industrial mass capacity that inspired rather than rivalled with a perchance for the consumer of limited means, a standard set hard to question. More radical, and perhaps harder to replicate, he raised wages by 120 % to $5, or 1/72 of a standard model a day, to exult even greater efficiency and make the Ford Motor Company the premier patron of low-skilled labour, and thus (not nonwithstanding) the prime producer in a rapidly growing field. In 1918, half the cars in the United States were a black model T and Ford himself had become the largest automobile producer, the first to have thought feasible that which Herbert Hoover later denoted as the dream of "a chicken in every pot and a car in every garage", the chickens flocking to the pots as much as the cars made an everyman's luxury, by the end of the century being hardly even considered a luxury at all. In 1926, the company introduced the five-day, 40-hour workweek, further bolstering output and worker loyalty. In this struggle he did not stand alone, but would be a main architect of the consumer society as well. With the increasing contradictions and struggles which came to a close during Hoover's days, and it became questionable whether the system which made Ford, and Hoover, could sustain itself or their manyfold beneficiaries turned more reluctant. Across the Atlantic this sway would turn into bloody mayhem, stoked by the reading matter Ford had gratuitously produced and distributed to awaken Americans in face of an everlasting, and very omnipresent Jewish menace.

The source of Ford's antisemitism is not very well known, but was almost certainly stoked by the fires which burned bright in the East and across Europe, and the presumption of a Bolshevik-anarchist subversion against Anglo-Saxon creativity, Christian society and American toil and success, as expressed by his own life's achievements. Biographer Robert Lacey claimed that it may have ultimately closed his own life, as he suffered a final and debilitating stroke during a newsreel of Nazi concentration camps. In this flirt or rather obsession, not unrivalled, may qualify as one of the most flagrant, if not functional, cases of a man who was on "the wrong side of history".

How he would have fared in Ferdinand Porsche's or Fritz ter Meer's situation, we may not know. But as Porsche and KdF failed to rival Ford's success, so did managed totalitarian economies fail to replace the king. The capitalist economy, and consumer automobile ownership, endured and eventually reached a further zenith after the war which followed, although bolstered by increased regulatory frameworks and the industrial economy would eventually reach a point of robotisation and relocation that quashed any hopes of a workers' capitalism, killed by the ecstasy of the means which made its sustainment profitable, and thus possible. How much he helped to accomplish its consummation, and the unprecedented wealth eventually seen at the close of the century of the automobile, we know not either. But in any individual case, he would have influenced as much as he was moved. Like Tesla, Edison and scores of inventors and innovators after him, and Thomas Jefferson before him, a celebration to the universal genius that resides in the eccentric.


Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924)


The only one to have caught my eye, so to speak, if from a state of slow and ghostly mouldering thus consigned over a stretch of ninety years, caught on as his empire - the state he built - gradually faced a lingering and ultimately fatal decay of its own.

How could we describe him, apart from (as well as making justice to) Robert Service's statement that indeed "we live in his shadow"? In the lingo of builders; the architect, if it doesn't sound to pessimistic, of the modern bureaucratic-totalitarian state, although its facets may not have been those he had selected at another time. The destruction ball and undertaker of an old and society which, in his analysis, had come to a point of self-breaking, a humanity divided, and yet strained against orthodoxy in his proposition that radical socio-economic change could be orchestrated, ultimately, in a society so backward that his great master had never bothered to renounce it. You make your soup with the ingredients at hand, as a great Swedish cook supposedly (but, as with many cases, probably never) said. His country, his people were Russia, and the first to be rocked by major upheaval in the first existential struggle of this century of revolutionary alterations challenged only by the previous. His life, blossoming in this catalyst of carnage and change, had been prepared for this moment. He acted with novelty decisiveness, intrigue and stubbornness as he returned from exile to encompass the destruction of a dynasty responsible for the death of his older brother Aleksandr Uljanov, the man of Simbirsk, and eventually millions of others - the inexorable march not towards, but already into something different, a baptism of fire and blood that would not only destroy old Russia, but make the new world.

And home he spirited, or was spirited; aimed, inserted and (in Churchill's words) injected into the Russian body politic. Months later, after steering fractional infighting and yet another exile, in the eery dark hours of an early morning in what was October on the pages of the outdated Czarist calendar, the man of history emerged victorious - not a victor, but at head of an unruly movement how united, at least inside the borders within it would finally govern, and ultimately most potent of the forces unleashed. Old Russia had seen a potential which its institutions and traditions were unable to capitalise on, which would eventually - within the lifetime he might have expected - see the rise of the country as the a superpower on a map made bipolar.

But Lenin would see none of it. Suffering from a number of conditions since long, and baptised in power with a submersion into incapacity by an hail of bullets sent by a scion of the deposed Socialist-Revolutionary party - which under Lenin's dominance had bested him in the election to the Constituent Assembly, Russia's first real parliament, almost immediately discarded - his health subsequently deteriorated, his body made useless just as the war had been turned and the world won for the new state. He would spend his last two vile years a figure more impotent than the lesser of the Czars whose position of ritualistic symbolism had earned his hatred. In death, this humiliation would escalate under a successor he had groomed, then struggled, and arguably acted to preempt, one who would go on to massacre most of the men of 1917 - and a few of its illustrious women too - in a sanguinary vortex of personal ambition, imperialist state building that would rival the world and exceed that under which they were born, and entrenching "Marxism-Leninism" as the leading force of the workers Lenin had hoped to unite.

His failure may have proved even more fatal, had he lived to see his further successors and their treatment of his legacy and in the remains smouldering, if yet in greatness, one may only ask if the Germany a century later has not proved in spite of its failed revolution a better case for the workers' state, a state of justice and rid of want, and what could have accomplished had it been rocked into the violent currents of 1917-22. Seldom before, and never after, had someone so readily stood at the gates of history both as a case of greatness accomplished - in pursuit of either terror or the promise of a future without the throes of abjection - and the empty promise of the counter-factual which, in slightly different circumstances, could have been that shadow.


Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997)


Previously well covered in a post regarding the fourty-year anniversary of his rise, the small Chinaman - who could have kissed Kylie Minogue without bending and might have refused out of sheer pragmatism - spoke soft words but changed the third actor of the Cold War period to drastic ends, although not so drastic as it would eventually become. Still, the altered fates for the many he helped conquer and eventually ruled, and for the contingent difference in outcomes had he not risen, he earns a clear spot as the man who changed both his country and the outcome of the century. Arguably, for the better.

Deng Xiaoping was born a Hakka, the endo-Han ethnic group associated with the leadership of the Taiping, the most significant of many movements to rock the corrupt, decaying and eventually dethroned Qing tutelage, whose position on that day may yet have seemed unassailable. After training in France, a return to a country wrecked by long-delayed change and upheaval, of a nation breaking apart and a society deeply at odds with its bimillennial legacy, Deng joined the nascent Communist Party (Gongchandang) in its early infancy. It might not have spelled his path to power. After spending years hiding in the mountains after the collapse of the Jiangxi Soviet, haunted and betrayed even by the socialist state whose main interest had been the devouring of Mongolia and Xinjiang into its own sphere of influence, the great and terrible war engulfing both - and finally uniting the revolutionary parties - would push China into the same mold.

But it was only after its own revolution came into Deng's hands that China could stand up and walk with dignity past its northern neighbour. After destroying the Japanese, Chiang's "disease of the skin", the Reds would escalate the struggle and push Guomindang into the sea and over it, and under the new constitution of 1954 Deng finally rose to the position of finance minister. He would not keep it long, and spent years of increasingly erratic and sanguinary purges - and the great starvation which would double the pain and consumption of the war - he was stripped of all offices, exiled, and all but lost his eldest son, beaten and abused into a less illustrious station. Had it been Deng, or had he suffered the fate of many others - including Mao's dauphin Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi, the nominal supreme official - we might know a very different China.

After the death of the Chairman, the table would creak - and all bets were off, and increased manyfold. But ultimately, the alliance with the man christened as the young and impotent ultimate successor, the Malenkov of the Red Emperor, secured his return to power and rise within the Central Committee, without ever becoming the head even of the party apparatus. His personal dignitas was so looming that he could sway policy decisions and direct them through his (gradually junior) proxies, only remaining the chairman of the military commission, the newly created advisory commission and the Chinese bridge society, from which he maintained this position already conquered with the grace, cooperative instincts and soft eloquence of a player of the game. Antagonising the Vietnamese, reconciling with the Indians and maintaining and strengthening the bond with the United States which drove an ultimately tripolar Cold War to a conclusion, his main object into which he poured his prestige was the reconstitution of the revolution, and of revolutionary China itself under the principles of Deng Xiaoping Theory (邓小平理论), and the more universal and compact notion of "seek truth from facts" (实事求是), often summed up by the maxim that the cat - whatever its colour - must foremost be concerned with catching the mice. Its inherent pragmatism and reduction of dogma was a cold breeze, but if the world had found the new leader a member of a reformist camp, its contents would stun nonetheless.

The result, secured and emerging potent only under the 1990s, was grandiose indeed, and put the country onto a path whereby its internal strength would inevitably accomplish the hopes of Chinese intellectuals for two centuries of stagnation, subjection and starvation - intellectual and political as well as raw, material - under a pennant far wider, and perhaps more promising for democratic aspirations, often mechanistically and dogmatically understood as part of economic liberalisation and decentralisation. But as for the latter, while the eastern twin whose pursuit of the same path under different conditions had just seen and all but endorsed the formation of a real opposition party, Chinese activists raised their voices in defiance not only of Deng, but the Gongchandang predominance and a history of Chinese authoritarian rulers in itself, and in Zhao Ziyang found a living voice within the establishment willing to take their side and argue the case of political reform. Deng, ever the flint-hearted pragmatic molded by the starkest of reality, sent in the tanks and snuffled the rebellion before it started, detaining Zhao for the remaining years of his life, to scant praise and glowing condemnation. But the repression came too soon to seem unprecedented, and hostility could not resume. His last years would be more quiet, but help establish the predominance of his reforms, as well as the inception of a non-autocratic system later to bend. As he died, he left an obvious successor, but within a different system and a different China, most clearly defined by the reduction of North Korea from a client slave state into a peculiar and erratic phenomenon, parted in essence from the moderation of its great and increasingly uncomfortable patron.

His work, rather than his creed, fought for and built new China in all its greatness, its reduction in poverty and its stark repressive horror, but nevertheless inaugurated a new era of optimism over dogmatism, development over worldwide ambitions, accomplishment over brazen unity. As the new century loomed, one may not have proposed which change it would accomplish in the world, rather than the opposite, but like Marx it is a question which looms larger as the years pass by and the influence makes itself further known farther from its shores.


Edward Bernays (1891-1995)


You would be forgiven for not knowing about him. Still, suggest he hasn't had an impact on the life you lead - perhaps so many main facets of it - and you may be mistaken in a manner so as to make him very proud indeed. Bernays was a maker in the shadows, a remaker of countries who never raised a sword, a Kaunitz or Machiavelli or Metternich whose works - and words - were never consigned to and often parted from the strictly political. A nephew of Freud, and arguably the last standing of the "great Austrians" of the 20th century, his talents would transcend the strictly personal and psychological to the great affairs of state, of sociology, mass politics and economics, and - above all - consumer society as a practice and an ethic. The greatest changers of history, it must be said, are those whose paradigm are so hard to grasp, yet seemingly so entrenched. Hegel, Aristotle and Luther are easily forgotten, but the residue of their produce so ever-reaching. From Bernays' theory of mass behaviour, and how it could be manipulated - rather than, as was the case for Marx, merely predicted - would emerge not only a series of propagandistic means of warfare seemingly more fit for the era of nuclear non-warfare and perpetual power balance, the new society of the postwar period, defined by consumerism and propaganda, in its wider, less sneering sense. In this, every society of affluence live within his legacy, and reproduce it whilst knowing. What Freud did for psychiatry, he made for Western capitalism, and in this made it stronger and more pervasive in times of great trials.

The manufacture of consent, in itself a revolutionary concept, would be ironically more potent in the society lauded for its liberty, on which Bernays' family threw itself, and he his career. He assisted Calvin Coolidge in his successful 1924 campaign, which saw Coolidge win an absolute majority despite the re-emergent fracture between progressive and conservative Republicans from 12 years before, and carried the means of hard, scientific-tested campaigning to the foreign policy field until the end of the Cold War and the emergence of American consumer capitalism, at the shelf and ballot alike, as the unquestioned victor, having broken down socialist alternatives in the Soviet Union and Sweden. He made women smoke by making smoking feminist, he made bananas popular amongst a wider selection of consumers to a tally of millions and billions, and complimented the workingman's egg breakfast with a Catholic marriage with bacon, all by nudging at the lowest denominators in preference selection, and in this accomplishing more than had been done by any sinister preacher or microphone-kissing dictator in manufacturing what the totalitarians could not; the desire of the subject, and by so systemic means so as to make it almost scientific, in this preceding the attention economy. As Schopenhauer famously claimed, man "cannot will what he wills", but what was filling this mysterious void, he could say little. Few before Bernays would have tried to answer it. But as the century came to a close, which he would follow into the IT revolution, the Clinton administration until its last breaths, Edward Bernays and Walter Lippman held the greatest credit of shaping the new world marked by Fukuyama as the destiny of mankind - now, as he would have affirm poignantly with scant idealism, like wiping a smudge, humankind.

Among his lesser known, and lucrative works include assisting the establishment of the NAACP, increased awareness of multiple sclerosis, and arguably put his theory in service of democratic institutions and several progressive causes - but facing rigid criticism for undermining its tenets, including by author and critic Marvin Olasky, who suggested Bernays' scientific approach to the inner workings of decision-making made the notion of equal, independent-minded citizens more harm than a growing bastion of freedom, a point echoing in the age of stolen elections, troll armies and desinformation, the balkanisation of the media and the disintegration - and perhaps reemergence - of legal constricts.

What he would have said in the era of Facebook, Snapchat, Cambridge Analytica, Netflix - the latter being founded by his great-nephew - and the emergence of the attention economy and netocracy to displace physical consumption, or rather improve it, we cannot know. But in appealing to the personal and narcissistic in individuals, he managed to govern them all, in a way negating Marx' precepts as the great socio-political revolver of the 20th century.

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.


Edward Bernays




Finally, a fifth name, which would have to be offered as a dark horse had I not thought it in the very top tier. Which, of course, it reasonably must be:


Maria Skłodowska (1867-1934)

Hers was the first recognition with no equal of its kind twice granted, both earnestly, and the first issued to a woman scientist in the - dare I say it? - actually accomplished, prestigious categories. From not so illustrious beginnings, Polish Maria Salomea fought, moved, loved, delved deep into the expanding frontiers of natural science, rejected orthodoxies and never stopped the relentless pursuit of enquiry, wherever its truth and its undue harshness would take her. Ultimately, her work very much changed the workings of the 20th century more so than Alfred Nobel's own, or her predecessor Wilhelm Röntgen's, of science and society as well as geopolitics and ideology, and grant an eery truth to the pricemaker's desire for a weapon so destructive it would render war all but impossible. A child of a homeland lost and the first woman accepted as a professor at the Université de Paris, an institution of early beginnings but not as mighty a name as Sorbonne, her research would earn her a Nobel Prize in Physics in 1903. In an alleged fit of precautionary madness, the initial laureates would have been her husband Pierre, and co-researcher Henri Becquerel, for groundbreaking work on radiation. More memorably, the subject matter would pose an eerily prescient hint on the manner of their deaths. Her doctoral adviser, Gabriel Lippman, would follow her only five years later, for his own research.

For they met in

Einstein once said that of all the celebrities of his time, Marie was the one who fame had not corrupted (ostensibly, though his sentiment may not rule it out, excluding himself). Few of her kind would pay so high a price, and the wrecking fate inflicted on both the Curies, and for which there was not then any effective cure, would double down on the so lately restored Polish commonwealth by a rising threat whose ambitions her field would have to marshal their best to quell.

tisdag 18 december 2018

Two score years of Dèng Cháo


The 18th of December, after two years of cementing his power and fending off the ambitions of the Siren Bang with only the final humiliation and destruction - if, gracefully, not physical - left, the barely five foot one Deng Xiaoping, master of everything but no station within the all-powerful Communist Party of China rose to the podium of the third plenary session of its 11th Central Committee to announce the beginning of the new world. If the proclamation could not have estimated the passing of things within the next half century without edging on insanity, even in the presence of a man so modest in stature and speech, it was controversial in its date and could only have emerged from the most vitriolic, if gently managed and peacefully concluded conflict with the orthodox factions within the party. In the end, the confirmation of Hua Guofeng - forgotten leader-paramount - would have been crucial to the collapse of the Gang of Four and the radical transformation about the begin.


A speech that would change everything. While reform might have been expected after the sanguinary epoch of the chairman - the post his true successor would never hold - the truth to unfold, and its fruits, would have stunned both sympathisers and the translucent antagonism of the gang of four.

For what proposed by Deng - again, only so subtly but yet groundbreaking, as crowned by the most counter-revolutionary proposal the previous year of cats and mice, and that the revolution must, in our reality, be subservient to facts and reality, with a clear priority of building a powerful state adhering to socialism rather than the opposite - was no short of a revolution far more groundbreaking than the 1949 Maoist surge and the expulsion of the Guomindang to Taiwan and a few scattered nearby islands. As Chiang had, after a career of criminality, massacre, corruption, conquest, calamitous defeat, staggering, theatrical rise, humiliating staggered consolidation and downfall, final ignominious defeat, bested Mao in performance and dynamism and the great quest - if yet in the incubator - of reviving a great China so long and ingloriously negated, now was the time to ameliorate the damages continually done for two thirds of a century by domestic forces.

Deng's vision, following a different path but in the steps of the Han Chinese-dominated city state of Singapore and its, to Deng, inspirational Lee, and the (more) authoritarian Republic of Korea of Park Chung-hee as by Chiang's China (abandoned recognition, finally and conveniently, this year by the US State Department) in the end turned out an utter and astounding success. Utter and astounding not because of its relative success comparable to the performance of the "tigers" which took the first leaps fresh out from carnage and colonial status, but because of the completion - or nearly thus - of the task left unmade since the aspirations of Cixi and Sun Yat-sen in the last days of the Qing; indeed, since the very first contacts with the West, which had only made apparent the stagnant state of the giant once unrivalled.

First, agriculture was de-collectivised, foreign investment encouraged and restrictions on business limited. After strong initial success, in the late 1980s, the process was carried on to extents of Milton Friedman's liking, involved lifting financial regulatory frameworks, except in key sectors such as banking and petroleum. The grapes of this reevaluation of doctrine, brave if made by the scions often dear to the chairman shortly before, have changed the landscape of China and just as certainly the world, and it is no conservative estimate to announce that if a similar survey as made in 2012 by the author were penned, the name most certain to be included would be that of Deng Xiaoping.


The real revolution, acknowledged. Since the stagnant decline of the Qing, the Asian counterpart of the Ottoman's sick man of Europe, dreams of a rising China have fallen upon different hopes, from the late Sun to the lengthy Chiang, to the Mao of many actions and initiatives. 

After the implementation of the reforms, swift change followed. In the 1980s, Deng's definite decade, GDP nearly doubled. From the year of the speech until 2013, it would grow with a mean of nearly 10 %, rekindling Napoleon's prophetic words of the rising dragon. In the 1990s, to his continued aspirations but relaxed stewardship, China was able to establish itself as a normal international actor and business partner, and eventually reclaimed Hong Kong and Macau, and in 2001 joined the World Trade Organization. The territorial integrity of Qing, bar Mongolia and pugnacious Taiwan (though mutually recognised as part of China) had been reestablished.

The inspiration for this remaking, nothing short of a revolution within the revolution of 1949, has been speculated widely, but key interest has been invested in the "Hong Kong model" emerging from the 1960s, within the framework of British colonialism but effectively a system of moderate self-government, of Chinese culture juxtaposed with economic freedom and - eventually - progress and civic virtue and peace heralding a welfare comparable to Western countries. But equally impressive, and arguably more influential, would have been the republic of Singapore, in 1965 declared independent in brusque separation from Muslim Malaysia to the tears of its longtime leader Lee Kuan Yew, whose juxtaposition of capitalism under state-guided leadership, but also of economic liberalism to developmental authoritarianism, had managed to successfully steer it out of a colonialist mould, and far from direct it to a position independent to its neighbours be the tiger of South East Asia, the envy of a continent as far as material concerns were considered. All this from an idea and a strong hand - and arguably a convenient deep-sea harbour. China sported no such comparative advantage, but a large population and army (armed with nuclear capacity) and auspicious natural resources arming it for an independent course of its choice.


The re-emergence. Once the great economy, rivalled only by its south-west neighbour, now soaring well above it. Will the red line claim the world, as well, in a rise of all of Asia, or eventually be harnessed by it? 

The great political assumption regarding the future of the Rénmín Gònghéguó, and perhaps even its status as such, strengthened with the continued bond with the United States into the end of the Cold War, was the emergence of liberal democracy and institutional reforms to this effect - alternately, inexorably, a downfall akin to that of the more reluctant Eastern Bloc states, which came to an ecstatic climax but not a final showdown with the protests at the Tiananmen Square in 1989. Against certain expectations, this was not due to an innate desire of political liberalism accompanying the emergence of capitalism, nor (as is usual) against stagnant living conditions, but actively encouraged by elements within the ruling Communist Party, most notably by Chairman Hu Yaobang, whose deposition in 1987 had led to discontent regarding the future course. Following his untimely death - also coinciding with the unrest, or often the lack of it, in Eastern Europe - discontent grew into open protest, culminating in the great opposition on the Tiananmen Square still crowned with the portrait of the (former and eternal) chairman, which had displaced the earlier one of Chairman Chiang. In this, Hu's successor Zhao Ziyang took sides with the protesters and ultimately, the protest was subverted by the same means that might have expected, and the political reform process stalled. It would not hinder Deng himself, closer to 90 than 80 before the summer was at an end, from withdrawing gradually from his unnamed seat - rather than resigning it - through the following years.

With this chapter closed, the work to build "socialism with Chinese characteristics", in fact an abandonment of socialist orthodoxy and any semblance of the Marxist-Leninist one-party state as much as democracy, could really begin. It would involve - in short - a number of foundations including a rotating, meritocratic order, with oligarchy maintained, under a single-party developmentalist governance, including social constricts like the one-child family with its demographic consequences, a rigidly managed but not micromanaged capitalist economy and societal ethic both freer and eventually controlled by means unavailable to the previous leadership. Two of these core features have been rescinded lately, but the bedrock remains not only a potent contradiction - more so than its manifold critics - but a formula continuing to ride the dragon out of its long rest. 

With forty years passed since the takeoff of Deng's agenda, and a stark twenty years since his death, his legacy stands as the perhaps most significant of any 20th century leader, and the most significant Chinese since the emperors, perhaps since Qin Shi Huangdi himself. But compared to it, any other geopolitical change bar the collapse of the Soviet Union - partly his achievement - shrinks in comparison.


This storm was bound to come sooner or later.

Deng Xiaoping, 9 June 1989


When our thousands of Chinese students abroad return home, 
you will see how China will transform itself.


Deng Xiaoping, as quoted by Forbes Magazine, Vol. 176 



A revolutionary and reformer. A work still in progress under a looming tombstone. A nation riveted by change. As change in its own form comes to Hong Kong, one may ask whether political reform was intended as such, or even necessary to the relative political and economic liberalisation occurring as a result of Deng's policies, with some Sinologists (or Zhongnanhai-ologists) pointing out the example of Singapore. Nevertheless, just as the 1978 Party Congress unleashed the floodgates of China's geopolitical prominence, reform made possibly both the 1997 handover and the current Gleichschaltung. One should never lose sight of the fact it could all have been very different. 




söndag 16 december 2018

The Strange Death of Swedish Liberalism


The downfall, heralded and now allegedly conceived, of the Swedish right wing - or rather, its subversion by first a new right-right or conservative bloc incorporating the damned antithesis of liberal thought within the octocracy, second by a potential, ostensibly everlasting and potent middle ground of Swedish Social Democrats, Green and more centre-leaning "liberal" parties - has been followed by resounding calls that the Swedish political bloc system which for fourteen years kept an alleged state of peace, has finally moved from a state of decay to complete and unquestionable desolation. Left from this, just as roughly summed up, a tripolar field of three, or arguably four, blocs with the inexorable march of the Sweden Democratic beast into the halls of power (stopping short just of the door to the negotiating room, but keeping an ear tight and passing its will through ardent knocks) has stopped in a rather open, if lukewarm and uneasy truce with the uneasily dubbed "conservative" parties. Left now is the verdict - under the same adage of adapt or die proclaimed by the aggressively reluctant P W Botha and now heard by the Moderate and Christian Democratic leaders - to be said by the liberals, or the liberal left, when all that is left are Scylla or Charybdis, or the letting of electoral blood beneath the line of political (if not ought cultural) significance. This is especially ardent for the newly christened Liberal Party which may, at the snap election resting at the whim of its significantly more endowed bedmate or the collapse in coherent discourse, be reduced from opportunistic laughing stock to a banner raised - or should I say erected - proudly in the boglands that is extra-parliamentary politics of Swedish democracy.

There are several reasons for this course of actions. The entrance and subsequent, unhampered rise - predictable as it was - of the Sweden Democrats and the reduction of any plausible government to a minority status dependent upon the goodwill, often amiss, of the opposition(s) in a decaying (and unfortunately never-dying) state of bad theatre, of the kind apocryphally denigrated with the gilded review of "She's in the attic!" in places where actual actors assume the roles. Further, the breakdown of the bloc most likely, if not keen, to reassess this order and ask, why not, to the very open invitations of the third party - here a lever of supreme power rather than a status of insignificance - has not been replaced by the logical, and necessary (presuming a majority-supported government) realignment of the unwilling centre to the centre-left, rather than be joint bedmates with the party branded with full, indeed intensified vigour, as the "far right" even by its expected partners.

Several reasons, in addition to the "bad theatre" narrative and the rise of cosmetic politics - the rise of the optics, the actor, the career - for this failure include the unwillingness to adapt to certain realities, and we see in the end is a division between the politics of change and of careerism, which explain the aforementioned rise as much as anything else. In the deep gorge between the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats, a number of camps have been struck, now come together to agree of their unwillingness to agree even over this simple fact: That politics is now dead, and that the age of theatrics is to remain - even after the de-demonisation of the latter which is as inevitable as that of the former - is not a sweeter dish than the great narrative of a struggle against the supreme bespectacled evil. Isolation is a currency of substantial worth in a , but it is now quickly being depreciated (or rather inflated by the expansion of this stratagem in a transition of sniper to mass shooter) while the value of the Sweden Democratic bloc has and will continue to rise - until it is empowered and tasked with ruling the people it has so dearly pledged itself to serve, and which it most certainly entirely loves or entirely hates. A test for any good man of prowess, deep-rooted knowledge and exercise in self-control.

Most annoyingly, to certain liberals including the aforementioned author is the level of hypocrisy, so exorbitantly exhibited, in the transition through (not from) the previous state of ignorance, denial, through many shades of anger to gradual acceptance and bargain to a point where - if there is not to be an agreement between the long-dreaded Labour Party, the cause of conservative-liberal unity (and subsequent hegemony) in the first place - an agreement can be made over the cordon sanitaire, lest it will be have to be broken in a painful cultural shift. The maintenance of a culture of theatrics in this brave new politics is certainly a fact, whilst predictable, does not deserve the epithet annoying. That the grander shift in the paradigm, if not entirely in the discourse, has succeeded a long period of chicken race against this shift, rather than made possible by the pressing presence of this ahistoric third bloc, has certainly not increased the confidence in its adaption or the attempt to fuse liberal doctrine and pathos with hard authoritarian, if largely impotent countermeasures.

With this adaption appearing more and more a question of another generation, if not part of a global attempt to control the assailable but fundamentally irresistible flow of migrants from an impoverished and increasingly unstable south to a relatively impoverished and increasingly unstable north, soon to be reconfirmed by an ever-unstable European Union; more so, if Britain were to reclaim its place. In reaction to the reaction itself to these challenges, the liberal centre-"far right" (in the old order of things) contenders have posed an extreme lack of enthusiastic vision, bold ideas and - above all - confidence.


The unlikely support group. But possible in a centre-left united in a paradigm of democratic oligarchy, foremost defined in its extreme reactiveness. But, as Napoleon said, the one on the defensive, immersed in conserving the present from within his fortress, is sure to be beaten no matter how comfortable - or necessary - the seat may seem. What victories will they claim? How much will they accomplish? Will the coalition spanning from far right to far left (in the old language) prove a last psalm for the old republic, or the beginning of a Dutch order of colourful blocs of the old Swedish principle, rule by consensus and outside-the-tent approval?

Let us examine, briefly, the history of the two parties jointly composing the new "liberal" bloc, between the traditional left and right, and the fourth pole in a previously sustainable, albeit unstable three poles system that followed almost immediately upon the alignment among two, and the affirmation of party politics in the majority and of a broader spectrum of seven... now eight... unlikely to change drastically in the face of aggrieved voters, a fact reinforced by the fact, not sad in itself but perhaps the saddest of this election, that all (if barely) clung to their seats, while amongst the oft-spoken outsiders none came even close, and the proposed true contender, the Sweden Democrats, once and future king on an apocalyptic mission to salvage Swedish civilisation - symbiotic in this aspect - was reduced to near naught after a bitterly unfought campaign by many unsung heroes under a hydra unfit to either designate a leader or replace them. And, it may be said, a glaring lack of interest, at least among the traditional media networks, which was key in the party's 2014 near-triumph.

The blatant absurdity that one may, from a starting point of great ostracism and scarce resources conquer three in every hundred voters and still want for any representation is a fact crafted for no dignified composure, and its equally unsung proposition that the alternative is fragmentation and chaos has proven itself as absurd as the old, and rather undemocratic maxim that certain numerical standards must be upheld... lest the worst among us will be let into the halls of power. However you may wish to design an electoral system, it cannot be on the basis that a particular actor should be excluded or reduced - fear that actual proportional representation would deign the Sweden Democrats a seat in this assembly. As for now they stand at better seat than vote tally, as is the granted custom. A better remedy, and my alteration - and altercation) of choice, would be to remove this threshold - indeed, of all thresholds - and create a national constituency, above all forcing existing actors to fight on the basis of the best program, rather than being the puny, miserable least offensive of the seven - I mean eight - currently in existence, for all intents and purposes.

The question now is the same as before the election: Which shift is first to occur. Either the full split in the centre-right, as fully fictional as the presumed unity of liberals or liberal thought, with a liberal bloc forming the fourth pole, in a new (and certain uneasy) coalition with, and soon within the broad left, highlighted ironically with their enmity against or the continued fealty of these parties in submission to an equally untried, but more formidable alliance between the "true" liberal opposition this new and impervious hard right. In the case the Liberals alone remaining, seemingly more content with the latter, it will not suffice. The initiative is thus entirely with the Centre Party, which faces the terrifying conundrum of a double lock of two negative votes and two more or less explicit promises, both of which cannot be continued to be honoured, if a government is to be formed. Broken promises are easily forgotten, but not always the men - and women - who disgraced themselves with the conduct. Chairman Lööf, unless a personality change is to occur, is unlikely to come out of this coalition washed free of chicanery, with the stoutness of a stateswoman.

It is, with this said, crucial to analyse the structural rather than ideological tenets within the liberal bloc preventing this realignment from coming into full fruition, rather descending into a deadbeat force certain to lose, and perhaps be erased upon an otherwise inescapable fresh election. As it stands, the left - in this sense including the centre-liberal parties - has been reduced to a state of being entirely reactive, formulating policy directly in opposition, rather than alternative to the Sweden Democrats and an emerging "conservative bloc". The realignment into a permanent centre-liberal "left", facing scant opposition from an aggrieved but reluctantly reluctant Left Party and half-growling conservative parties backing a hard-conservative pitbull, would destroy Swedish liberalism in so far that liberal voters would have to force their own realignment either to this opposition, with its potential of an economically liberal policy but being dead as a liberal bloc, or with the Social Democratic (yes, and -green) government.

If this is the future of Swedish liberalism, then Swedish liberalism is all but dead. Confused and battered and - perhaps the worst thing - unable to face its prospects to govern or perish, it has capitulated its responsibility. Solemn opposition, and the decided call for fresh elections, or perhaps more groundbreaking (be there shortly) reform of the system.

Another possible realignment could occur through the reinstatement, preferably with the Alternative Vote, of the long-abandoned one-member constituency voting system, and the subsequent rise of three electoral cartels; the Social Democrats, the liberal bloc, and a perceived, and then very real conservative bloc, with the Greens hanging onto either the first or the second, the left shattering (yet again) between scattered conscientious insignificance and re-joiners (and entryists), under the Social Democratic banner. In terms of electorate, these could enjoy roughly 30, 20 and 40 % of the vote respectively, suggesting - albeit it could well be wrong and underestimate, say, the rise of a strong left-populist party of 28/54 % vote/seat projection - why this change would likely be a dangerous step - lest the motives of current politicians are to derail the system under which they have prospered. It may be too late for such extreme measures to be effective to the purpose, if not too late to see them enacted.

So aside from this game changer, what reforms can be hoped for? I would, in an attempt at conservatism, propose the one mentioned: The elimination of the 1/25 threshold discussed to the point of nausea. It would almost certainly wreak havoc, but slower deaths upon those of failure who may as well face death in the 2020 election (or sooner than that) and the reinvigoration of an increasingly oligarchic system befitting the center-liberal parties less than others, and the introduction of a new not entirely defined by the great dark Other, born amidst raised arms and hooters of lampposts and those of the mosaic faith. This could, in itself, herald a liberal renewal, but would in itself spell a revitalisation of the democratic system ostensibly so beloved by liberal politicians. As it stands, this proposal is unlikely to be awakened, but may in the case of the declining Liberal Party spell its own - brief - salvation. Thus a lot to be gained, and perhaps a majority to be formed - if not from their new senior parter - leaving asides than the utilitarian argument often heard since the last American election, of making "every vote count". This would make as good an election promise and "single-issue" as any, and for all its dastard self-interest make even this disgruntled writer consider strongly the liberal ballot, now restored in name to its democratic roots, and if not wrinkle my forehead and see it go out finally with a pang of righteousness, truly deserved.


Fatal breakage? Now and then, a picture so apt - however feeble and unmajestic - as to shatter the illusions of a "grander" past, and readmit our understanding of the future. How will this image, heralding a (long-heralded) end to the 14-year matrimony, seem in another 14 years? Who, in terms of their offices, will not be there? Whose expressions will by then have been vindicated?

måndag 26 november 2018

Syria, shifting back into the lion's paws


The great shift in narrative which has, so far, been the most remarkable quality - in recognition of the value-neutral bodice of the term - of the great (you see?) Syrian war, a war of brother against brother, infidel against dissenter from an allegedly secular order, minority against the frightful prospect of repression, permanent exile, extirpation at the hands of the particularly blissful and violent of the suppressing minority locked within an aggrieved majority. And with the narrative winds have also shifted the winds of war, as underscored to the twittering, canary-like passivity of two American presidents and the sound and thunder of substantial Russian bombardment. This bombardment has typically followed an existing Assad strategy of minimising the viability and credibility of what might ubiquitously be called "moderate" Syrian forces, commonly understood by the acronym FSA or the "Free Syrian Army", in order to present a simple but horrifying choice, one where Trump and his presumed (if announced, certain to be praised) contender Tulsi Gabbard, arguably also Obama, were in full vitriolic agreement: Assad is preferable to the new Jihad.


Al Kasr Al Jihad. The bubble, so quickly inflated, so predictably collapsed. It has served its purpose. Broken, it will serve it better still... perhaps for another generation.

The juxtaposition of regime change, a word few would have taken in mouth before the 2011 eruption of underground but omnipresent opposition into full-blown, uncivil carnage, with a rump state dominated by a (or several infighting) emirate of silence is one of considerable joy, which the jihadist have been happy to oblige whenever in the spotlight. Whereas the patriarch and protector of the Alawites is only too happy to play the press with considerable skill (superior certainly to the whims and platitude present, or should I say predominant, in the Swedish attempts to form a government, in one of the most consensus-driven political cultures in the world) the Jihadis present a mesmerising notion to the believing - and those only about to take the step across the threshold into if not bliss then the all but certain promise of it - if only you join the cataclysmic upheaval not for the salvation, or even the destruction, of Syria but of humankind and the ushering in of a metaphysical paradise where your dues right now will translate into blissful eternal currency of no limitation.

For those too immature - or too blind - to see this promise, the more contained rantings of the lion and his well-cropped and -suited looks, are mesmerising only by comparison and finely articulated with gesture and content as well as greeting. But behind this façade, mesmerising only as far as you don't know the facts of pre-2011 Syria, or the stunning reality which eventually came out of it, rests an oppression so hideous that its articulation cannot be reduced to individual cases of murder, even if they were audaciously broadcasted in the most graphic detail, to the gibberish and most obviously abandoned slogans of Ba'ath pan-Arabist dogma. Everybody knows, in this age where not only arrogance and vitriol but also journalistic investigation can make this unseen suppression all the more visible, what a Syrian "peace" on the lion's terms will cost, and who will pay the price of peace, dearly bought for an outcome platitude would accept as status quo (ante bellum). The only sweetener is that his reputation and political leverage is sallied forever. But as tyrants from the Kims to the Mugabes to the Duvaliers would know the opinions of voters, and non-voters, matters little as long as the fall can be pushed beyond death; theirs or the opponents. Survival has been Assad's goal to higher degree than the resistance and through use of a cure of strong side effects - or an infection justifying their use - he has succeeded, and for reasons embedded in the deeply human understanding one can feel for this desire, interlinked to so many others... "privileged" as they are, lest they be interred.


Endorsed by some... hated by so many. But the hand which can lever the support that is needed to obliterate the opposition of force can withstand the vox of wailing for an eternity.


Why, then, can a revolution, in the proper sense, to the antebellum state not be said to be the more desirable of conclusions? First, remember - and have held in mind since the first shootings of demonstrations in early 2011, the brave escalation which followed and the desertions both laudable and in some sense predictable, which escalated the war of a regime on its people to a two-way street - that the outcome and the inexorable sensation of revanchism of many brands among Syrian Sunnis; democrats, socialists, liberals, feminists, Islamic or non-Western feminists, non-Ba'athist nationalists, Ba'ath supporters left out by the governing ethnarchy and the many and inherently self-divided brand of (domestic) Islamic revolution or Jihad or both, is too much a product of as well as antithesis too the longstanding and inherently unstable system which has for nearly half a century embattled and now perhaps harnessed, if not quite choked it. Peace will never reign, and democracy will not in the remotest sense be plausible until the Syrian majority have a say in its affairs, which will likely preclude any peaceful multi-ethnic and multi-religious government and demand the return of the Alawite state - or a confederal structure similar in ways to Lebanon or antebellum Yugoslavia or (more desirable, from a state of supreme intoxication) Switzerland.

None of these are compatible with Ba'athist hegemony or even the existence of the party in a governmental state, and the hegemony of one relatively obscure, unfortunately ostracised tribe over all things governmental. Nevertheless, the only order compatible with continued existence of Alawites is either a Syria divided or this comparably desirable, conceived, cobbled-together confederal construct. It is possible to fathom, under a broad-based agreement of the kind attempted and (well...) comparably accomplished in Libya, the latter to materialise, the former - while unlikely for this reason - having the benefits of elevating the Kurdish struggle to UN representation as well, and opening the question of a Sunni state excluding the northwestern coast and Kurdistan, but incorporating the Anbar province and other (as for now) Sunni-dense western chunks of Iraq. The Sykes-Picot quagmire redrawn rather than reinforced, with all their well-known complications.


The great man has assumed the stage, his whim and gestures changing the map. Could this have been foreseen even by the greatest critic of the liberal hegemonic order. The Syrian stage, if reduced to merely a stage, has seen it crumble.

The laudable efforts of the likes of De Mistura - to preserve a basin of credibility for the international community rather than even a shred of dignity and human value in the war-torn parts of the country -nonwithstanding, this outcome was while not predicted in some sense determined from the onset and the mixture of tepid reaction to outright incompetence from the Pentagon-Langley military-security regimen and its own quagmire of tactics and split bureaucracy. The "victory" of June 2014 (so convenient after the result of Ba'athist-Alawite Syria's first multicandidate election and its suicidal PR aspirations) for Assad's hopes to be the brave warrior resisting this new Caliphate if not for the latter, the entry of Russia into the conflict and finally the crushed hopes - probably too lately announced to be taken seriously - of the Clinton campaign collectively constituted the last blow against an already blunted skull of no menacing capacities. While airstrikes in the springs of 2017 and 2018 (one other being geared up if the signs are right) as a symbolic chastisement by her contender, while among the most laudable decisions of his halfway administration, are mere tokens with the possible benefit of upholding, well, that previously spoken red-line which - once stupidly announced - ought not have been broken. That is, at least not by its proud, and still celebrated herald.


The joint architects of the "moral collapse" that is Syria, and - perhaps? - of Western-American hegemony. The century, not nearly thus, conceived by Wilson, consummated by Truman, of American interventionism, and imperialism, has experienced a close. If repealed, will it be replaced? If not, could it be rekindled?

What then can be the conceivable strategy onwards? A new Syria must arise - but cannot stand on soles in the ashes upholding the lion's throne now reclaimed, now reinforced by a bloodbath twenty, thirty times that of Hama, recited previously as a crime against humanity whose proportions will now be forgotten or recounted as an earthquake for which this was a mere foreshadowing. The apple, as it were, falls never far from the tree. A stupid saying, but in this case a foolhardy and limiting one too. Accommodations must by needs be made for the Syrian exodus, for the many who will not and cannot return to the kingdom they hoped never to return to in its current state, and whose hopes and aspirations - I solemnly think - would have been best honoured by its transformation, its metamorphosis if not into a working confederal republic of peace and plenty, the consociationalist government of many and nucleus of such an order. This we could have accomplished, not without danger or controversy, nor without what was before known callously as "body count" (preferable to the suicidal, objectifying euphemism of "collateral damage") but in relation to the current state; a hideous price so dearly bought, by the Kremlin, by the Mullahs of Qom, by every foe of the Western liberal-democratic order, on behest and on the already overdrawn account of the tortured Syrian people. What could have been, if not better, than solely necessary, than a new beginning, and preferably before the self-made prophecy of a war of extermination between Syrian national socialism and Sunni Takfiri Jihadism came to full and hideous fruition, and the slobbering lukewarm statements of Assad as not preferable-but-preferable-still had changed into full-blown stupefying (as well as stupid) cries that this enemy, after all, must be destroyed, whatever the costs, whatever the unlikely allies (already held by these people, including the likes of Assadophile Galloway) one - that is to say, people long and far away from the battlefield - will needs contend with.

Above all, the narrative must change. Jihadism is Assad's business, not only in the more strategic entity of Hizbullah and affiliated groups, but the trafficking in his mortal enemies since at least 15 years for the very purpose of strengthening an enemy whose very existence will remedy his own most terrifying powers. The climax of this stratagem, not the valiant or not-so-valiant resistance to it, was the climax of the appalling shift that was the feature of remembrance of the Syrian "conflict". If there is to be a genuine pressure to cobble the construct that is Syria after its complete and utter collapse, it must not only involve the three regional powers which will do battle over the fate of Kurdistan - arguably the best outcome of the joint efforts of anarchy and Jihadism in the lands of Sykes and Picot, at least until the 2017 offensive by the puppets in Baghdad - and have already succeeded plunging Yemen into a state of similar anarchy from which it is unlikely to recover, if ever. But more of that later. It must also be the recognition that power exists for its own sake, and power in terms of the Alawite-Ba'athist power hub will by needs maintain the institutions which carried it through this the most supreme of crises. Just so as Prussia could survive the great crisis of 1762 to be defeated and mauled by Napoleon, actually by his little-known deputy, the regime may survive only to be sloughed in the next act, when Turkish, Saudi and/or Iranian troops are directly deployed in full-scale confrontation of a kind that will rock the boat.


"The slobbering dauphin of the slobbering tyrant that came before him..." Now, with Hitchens' words in mind, one must ask: Who was the the worse of the two? The grand ruler, prone to war and carnage, or the meek successor, so prone to open the door to reform... or unspeakable bloodbath?


For now, the Assad dynasty has proven itself against certain expectations made in the wake of the fire started by - but not without being first kindled within - the great Bouazizi in the moral and, in time, I hope but fear otherwise, political heart of the Arab world. While its nuclear programme remains (fortunately) disbanded, the Ba'athist regime remains as fit to survive as that of Kim... in time perhaps even more dynamic. Tained surely, but in an age where it does not weigh so heavily on reality or even conscience, it is not hard to see a rekindling of the friendships and hands offered even as arms and assassins screaming their intent as much as hatred of their benefactors were sent across the border into Iraq - that cobbled country so cruelly reduced by American weaponry - and so long as they maintain the flag of la Jihad fi Mamlakati it is certain to be a strategy of near-universal appeal, until certain red lines not drawn in Syrian blood are crossed. If the beneficiaries of the Salafi-Jihadi - and its more well-behaved, more genteel-martyred cousins - are not recognised in the same light, with the same or I would say more cynically opportunistic (or at least more blatantly or materially selfish) motives, the phenomenon of anti-Jihad, or I would say Counter-Jihad (in its worst implications, with a model set for more Western, more highly privileged counterparts to the marble halls of Damascus) cannot be understood or grasped for the tendency it is, and just as destructively - indirectly if not in its naked, bloodied, deniable not even to the likes of Alex Jones-een glory. Whether this triumph, and the triumph of mendacity and cruel polarisation and massacre in the service of humanity, will serve its scions well, in this generation or whether they be destined to be pushed onto the next third - akin to certain other challenges that will intersect with this one - but no further will surely be known, and perhaps ever glimpsed by the butcher himself.

söndag 9 september 2018

The Gavel and the Dagger


The upcoming election in Brazil has, in a focused moment of short duration, been denigrated from smooth sailing unto a coronation of the man whose first name already resembles the post-junta era into an upset of tumultuous, and eerily tragic proportions. First, and putting the gavel down on the hopes of and the two years that can be described (if not fully confirmed) as a quasi-legal, constitutional war against the Partido dos Trabalhadores camp, Lula of Brazil - surnames are superfluous - will remain in custody throughout the duration of what might have been his third and fourth terms, his candidacy rejected. With this decision, the aspirations of the PT of even reaching the second round are crushed, if not obliterated. The decision, as the Brazilians may have said it, is never final. Just as certain as the assumption that everything is fucked is that nothing is forever. Though, as that metaphor may suggest in its not-so-sublime eidelon of horror, is that bad times are here to stay, and maybe for too long for recovery. The sweet days heralded in 2002, at any rate, are now definitively in the past, its lions caged, humiliated and made ridiculous, by their sins as much as any effort.


So quickly, from sublime greatness and promise of renewal, to mediocrity fitted to no other name.

Second, the man dreaded and already marked - if not crowned - as the "alternative" as well as "alternative winner", hard-right darling and "Brazilian Trump" (fathom that, stacked with all your cultural prejudices) Captain Jair Bolsonaro has met upon a slimmer, less weighty, somehow less expected but possibly more final, more odious constriction when savaged by a sudden plunge of a sharp object in a less verbal and more unquestionably deadly case of electoral violence. In press releases, and not contradicting the well-known and fast-pulsating consequences of abdominal bladed violence, the great "alternative" has lost two fifths of his blood volume. What cannot be expected is that this gentle slump in electoral ethics will be followed by a corresponding one in the polls - at least, not for the intended target. Short of death, not to be ruled out but less likely (arguably less desirable) by the minute, and permanent brain damage (arguably less discernable) a peak for the rebel challenging a system is more likely. And in a gesture of some grace, under cause for grief if not under pressure, the candidate conceded that one can only expect the worst from a campaign so divisive, with rhetoric which may at best be described as colourful bouncing across the political field. With manyfold of tragic cases in recent memory, all that may be said is that in Brazil, no one is safe and only death (a)certain(s).

The emergence of the third of the BRICS economies, staggering now but previously jumping, clawing at roaring pace which dwarfed its historical (and, as of yet, perhaps more tragic) companion and near-nuclear partner South Africa has been marked with a division, which can only be summed up with the increasingly popular slogan, "polarisation". As the pace into the future are faced with new challenges, so the alternative pop up in the marketplace of ideas. Just as any marketplace, unwanted products are bound to be as thriving as people who think differently than your good self. Here, we are discussing the purchase of a head of a country of over 200 million, the ninth largest economy in the world. There are no opt-outs, save for exile. To let it depend upon the decision of a judiciary may (at least to a generally parliamentary-minded Swede) seem arbitrary. By the strong wrist that wielded a harmful object, much too close to playing canasta with the future of the growing Latin American power hub and its designated, in any outcome, economic and ideological - if not linguistic or cultural - nucleus.


The judge architects of this election, rigid shapers of its starting field. Now they, the less populist-friendly system they represent, the safeguardians of democracy, may soon be its victim.

So, how did we get here? In brief terms, the narrative seems to resemble a familiar one in Europe, particularly if one is careful to emphasise the history as east of the Iron Curtain. After many decades of repressive dictatorship which left many players still at the table traumatised and deprived of their fundamental rights way into their adults years (when did you last time consider the current Chancellor of Germany first cast her vote in a democratic election at age 36?). After its final collapse and the long-awaited and universally celebrated - even before Fukuyama's screeched-down but almost as universally accepted prophecy - arrival of democracy and an era of good feelings. After a two good decades party politics dominated by the emerging blue PSDB (or "toucan") and red PT (sometimes the "black cat") camps and two charismatic, heavy-hearted, committed leaders of wide-ranging popularity - Cardoso for the foremost and Lula for a strong and, until recently, still viable second - the shifting lines and personal ambitions, as well as shallowing waters of corruption now reaching, as they ever have, into the halls of power even when vacated and accustomed to new tenants, gradual to boiling distrust and uproar followed. Dilma, in a vote I considered ascertained enough to put my money on, defeated toucan veteran Serra and carried the PT banner into a new era of either Lula-ism beyond Lula, always a scary prospect even when the supposed power behind the throne is not a man of pure authoritarian ambition (as in the easy-forgone member of the BRICS club) or of party politics gone truly factional an impersonal, always unlikely even in a fairly stable presidential system such as the United States, confirmed in some sense in the last presidential election when, in the words of the great writer of history Victor Davis Hanson, the prospects and dreams projected by Obama proved not "transferrable to a 69-year old multi-millionare white woman engaged in scandal like Hillary Clinton". Damning words, but who will rise to negate them, or explore the mystical force which went to work in 2016 but not that night in Grant Park?


An invitation to violence... the promise of renewal stands strong, and stark, with the incoherent populist phenomenon, but alongside its equally incoherent promises are a lust, indeed a grab, for power as apparent as its disdain for its existing incarnations. But if he (so beloved by the Pentecostals, and not just of Brazil) can be named a Savonarola, the gnomes of Brasilia can rightly be called Borgias.



Brought down, but certainly not defeated. 

This - predictably, in some sense necessarily - did not happen, and combined with growing political resistance and abandonment of PT candidates, it was enough to indict her not long after her narrow re-election where she had already been christened the supposed establishment candidate by a broad range of established voces non populi, or senes not in the actual senate, and every living inhabitant of the office she aspired to occupy (always a bad sign) with a series of supposedly proven but by no means unusual or limited to the black cats currently enthroned accusations of record-level proportions. These accusations, now proven or accepted by the Supreme Court of the federation, are likely not ungrounded in substantial and, for the dreams and aspirations of the 2002 revolution, damning facts. They are however a reflection which - while acknowledging the right's being out of power for 16 years or indeed longer, if discounting not just Temer's apolitical or meta-political interregnum but also the preceding technocratic, fairly centrist Cardoso administration - does point the finger equally to the particular investment of the judiciary of investigating Socialist crimes against the state, while failing to uncover or properly manage the apparent and already-uncovered mismanagements of the tucanos in numerous state governments. For Bolsorano, in the very least, this may not be said, but such a verdict is not merely fresh, but also leaving a bitter vacuous taste of something far worse; a hint of bitter almond. If he is the alternative, not only to the argued betrayal of the Trabalhadores, which sins will be place in place of graft and the entrenchment of privation among the mobilised many? And will the machinery of extra-political bureaucrats, of which he may earn some clout but no more footing than the order just overthrown - rather than quietly, even shamefully abandoned, the great verb of the democratic ethos of consensus, another concept so shambolically trampled by the strongman vying so openly to pry her thighs - withstand his more foul and openly declared attempts to subvert the general, national and legal into the strictly personal, the Captain's whim?


Ejected, or self-evicted, from his master's table - but the rules of the court of the Trump are not those of the Tudors, and the old world is as ripe for taking as the new. The endorsement of the scion of national-populism in Brazil has not been as explicit, but nonetheless cloned a phenomenon deemed, to diminishing returns, as unelectable, unthinkable and undemocratic. It remains to be seen whether the wave of a "global national" movement will be redoubled in the elections to European Parliament in 2019, or whether it will be deemed arrested as in Le Pen's second place to Macron.

One certainly optimistic, if not unquestioned alternative is the "global movement" of anti-globalism, decisively democratic and populistic in its essence, yet with a clearly displayed nucleus of disdain - invective and in spirit - to the populus and to democratic institutions and practices (liberal democratic; in the Brazilian case the institutions which in supreme paradoxic heralded his rise) which lately has seen a formal endorsement by global and likewise Europhile pundit and agent provocateur (or rather agent of chaos) Steve Bannon of Bolsonaro's campaign. There are numerous ends, or rather paths, down this road: Either a bloc of generally amicable self-governing nation states, interlocked in mutual conflict successful in the spirit of mutural, haphazardly respectful cooperation (the rising tide of refugees would pose a main point of agreement) or eventual conflict; the twentieth century experienced anew rather than, as have been said of the new forces of the right, repealed? This is, it has to be said, not the object of this "new right", no more than the acquirement of Lebensraum for a steadily rising wave of domestic babes to mirror the changing political spectrum. (The domestic one, it should be said, will be hurtful enough, and spread far beyond the prospective boundaries of any Greater German, or Brazilian Reich.) The dynamic of the national-populist phenomenon, if it can be called such, turned against itself remains to be seen, but as the prospects of its evolvement into a synthesis of a post-liberal, post-nativist right (pick your term) seems unlikely to be peaceful and conciliatory, we - and in this case the great people of Brazil - may, with only a pugilist of mediocrity rising to catch it, be bracing for tough changes ahead.


Once so celebrated - but by everyone - now so humbled... Victims of the grapes of democracy, in their own right?

I have already mentioned that the greatest error of a Trump administration, now sordidly unaltered (though, in fairness, matched in this by many more admired, more cheered, including the scions of the Lula and Dilma soon to be more or less deserving martyrs) will be the failure to act on the great question of our time; certainly on this onset of our century. Will the great era of a post-political era, now thoroughly trashed and consigned to the dustbin as even its greatest foes yet sing their praise, and the still, if not more than ever, shaking boundaries of nuclear destruction and downfall keep sustaining pressure to the edge of civilisation's survival (now seemingly out of hands of any upcoming Brazilian junta) survive the destruction of the ecosystem which - even at the cusp of action in the rest of the world - may now be consigned to unalterable and devastating change on account of this man alone? All we know is that, as the Brazilians say, nothing is eternal, nothing is certainly fucked, and while the country has seen worse days, the world has certainly known better... and endured.