The Uneasy Friendship

 

For over eleven decades, the United States and its metastasis in the old empire (not that of Pitt, Pitt Jr. and porphyritic king George, but rather that accosted by accents and designs of such names) has had a relationship which only blossomed and reached a superb (or -fluous) peak with its downfall and denigration to the illustrious, and absurdly important polity which we long ago might have started calling the "republic of Taiwan". 

This week, the next jut in this series of humiliations bordering on tenderness came when the former president of the republic, Mr. Ma, visited the mainland - an act not so done since the republic, and his more illustrious (and audacious) forbearer Chiang actually ruled said mainland - and, more indignantly for the superpowers, the current president Tsai - now on the falling rope, as we say, or falling with a purportedly unassailable rope above them for so many decades - making a sweeping tour in the Americas, visiting her declining clientele of allies, but stopping for the inexorable (and inexorably condemned) meeting with the US Speaker, the with difficulty-elected McCarthy. He may not evoke the sentiment to "Red China" of his namesake (the drunk, that is) but surely there was more than manly courtesy in those eyes flashed (at a lesbian woman president, that is, for this beacon of ongoing patriarchal theocratic reinvigoration) reverence and respect. And, perhaps, gratitude, for small as it is, in this new landscape of China as the competitor - if not outright foe - in the East, the republic stands in the frontline, and would be the first (and perhaps only, in the strict sense) to face the Chinese onslaught. This use, if yet with consent, of Taiwan and its people as the aperture to Chinese expansionist aggression is a strategy as much as a commitment, and 

A Quisling, of sorts? Or expressing - asides the oft-praised "dove" mentality - the century-long desire of both Communists and "Nationalists" for a China united, under an unspoken authority, rather than permanently dislocated? Perhaps under an Emperor Xi? Would the competition between republic and people's republic ended be a legacy befitting Sun's name and thought? 

This twin visit confirms a presumption held long since: That while Guomindang has always been the party of unification (since the 1890s, actually) it is also the party of Beijing. I shall walk softly on such language, the cheap accusation of sell-out - now un-uniquely and frivolously as diarrhea employed against anyone not scaling the bandwagon to jut their crotches in direction of Moscow - is as useless as it is indiscriminate. But whereas many features of the style are similar , to the extent of Guomindang politicians certainly would glance across the strait to the Chinese model, or even consider themselves junior partners... dare I say Quisling, or Wang Jingwei... of a shape. This latter, however, is not the mainstream position, and appealing to it was what defeated the previously omnipotent "blue" in not one flunk, but two elections, setting "green" independence politics as the presumed new mainstream. This is not either the case, as polls may already predict, but certainly anyone of Sun's party will have to encompass the broader desire for effective independence and de facto sovereignty, and against any solution of suzerainty to the old rival. (Or, in plain stupid terms, show their allegiance to democracy and against populism, and so on, and so on.) Well, in recognition to old Chairman (also 主席) Chiang's hopes and plans (and those of his son, and his successor), why not? 

Let us consider a Chinese-dominated world order. I do not take this as anything else than a hypothetical consideration, because for all the seeming, and long-standing, inevitability of the current order's downfall and self-deceit in this, there are too many loose variables for even a "global" China to actually dominate Asia, let alone Africa or the Americas. Military power, once the beacon of the old empires, is the hurdling bloc which this neighbour of Japan, Korea (I mean the south), the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Pakistan and, yes, Russia, to be able to reach its arms wide. Population-wise, a barren fact in itself but the clock which set China - then a mere nuisance resisting Western or Japanese conquest, some of the time and with some aid, to the path of former greatness (again, with some aid). The fact of an East Asia dominated by China, with the fledgling set of American allies rolled back, can certainly be countenanced, but even that would involve an inevitable clash, if not directly of arms. Yet, with the current state of affairs, certainly it looks that way. 

A beautiful friendship, a subtle light shining, 

What of those who were against it? The fate of these allies (a resentful term, here signalling some degree of commitment, or often, a money relationship) "some of whom will be pardoned, and some punish'd", I would assume, but ultimately the Dragon will welcome into its (bur)lap everyone who asks for it, and ostracises the little warrior. For war is certain; the side effect of the suppression of Hong Kong (and, presumably, Macao) is that the Taiwanese will not surrender. Not in this generation. And the prospects of a new Paraguayan War (not to be easily countenanced by a willing aggressor) is absurd. Harder is the question whether these states, discounting the "states" in the Pacific which abandon at a pace as swift than the Qing dynasty unraveling the ally whose status they have (often very recently, after cash payments) issued, will ever find themselves between a surly "America" and a resurgent China, politically as much as geographically. 

The question, which assuredly remained unanswered in President Tsai's talks with Speaker McCarthy is; how much longer will this friendship last? Given the resurgence not only of China, "red" or otherwise (a Guomindang-label-on-lapelled Chinese president having been presented less graciously, and with fewer smiles, upon a very hypothetical journey to Los Angeles) there is every reason to expect the hands of the friend, if symbolically, grasping his weaker comrade even firmer. Abandoning a friend will only be tactical, if not tactful, upon the assault so severe whose stature one would be expected to defend. Given Taiwan's situation, and armaments, being the "poisoned shrimp" which Chiang's less authoritarian (and more appreciated) brethren prime minister Lee talked of, support upon an invasion is all but certain, with the unspoken variables of nuclear blackmail - China's weak arsenal being the three of clubs of its hand - and the prospects of a swift takeover or blockade. If this comes to pass, the Chinese leadership will most surely relish on the prospects of a "dove", or isolationist administration in Washington riding to governmental power on the Republican ticket, or quite soon, the Democratic one.   

A friendship long kindled, then in its prime. In the days when the republic outshone "Red China", so described, diplomatically and held a permanent seat at the UN headquarters in New York, steering the fate of Korea and many other nations, its economy basically equalling that of the uneasy neighbour as well. For how long, if ever, will it outstay its health?