The Strange Death of Swedish Liberalism

The downfall, heralded and now allegedly conceived, of the Swedish right wing - or rather, its subversion by first a new right-right or conservative bloc incorporating the damned antithesis of liberal thought within the octocracy, second by a potential, ostensibly everlasting and potent middle ground of Swedish Social Democrats, Green and more centre-leaning "liberal" parties - has been followed by resounding calls that the Swedish political bloc system which for fourteen years kept an alleged state of peace, has finally moved from a state of decay to complete and unquestionable desolation. Left from this, just as roughly summed up, a tripolar field of three, or arguably four, blocs with the inexorable march of the Sweden Democratic beast into the halls of power (stopping short just of the door to the negotiating room, but keeping an ear tight and passing its will through ardent knocks) has stopped in a rather open, if lukewarm and uneasy truce with the uneasily dubbed "conservative" parties. Left now is the verdict - under the same adage of adapt or die proclaimed by the aggressively reluctant P W Botha and now heard by the Moderate and Christian Democratic leaders - to be said by the liberals, or the liberal left, when all that is left are Scylla or Charybdis, or the letting of electoral blood beneath the line of political (if not ought cultural) significance. This is especially ardent for the newly christened Liberal Party which may, at the snap election resting at the whim of its significantly more endowed bedmate or the collapse in coherent discourse, be reduced from opportunistic laughing stock to a banner raised - or should I say erected - proudly in the boglands that is extra-parliamentary politics of Swedish democracy.

There are several reasons for this course of actions. The entrance and subsequent, unhampered rise - predictable as it was - of the Sweden Democrats and the reduction of any plausible government to a minority status dependent upon the goodwill, often amiss, of the opposition(s) in a decaying (and unfortunately never-dying) state of bad theatre, of the kind apocryphally denigrated with the gilded review of "She's in the attic!" in places where actual actors assume the roles. Further, the breakdown of the bloc most likely, if not keen, to reassess this order and ask, why not, to the very open invitations of the third party - here a lever of supreme power rather than a status of insignificance - has not been replaced by the logical, and necessary (presuming a majority-supported government) realignment of the unwilling centre to the centre-left, rather than be joint bedmates with the party branded with full, indeed intensified vigour, as the "far right" even by its expected partners.

Several reasons, in addition to the "bad theatre" narrative and the rise of cosmetic politics - the rise of the optics, the actor, the career - for this failure include the unwillingness to adapt to certain realities, and we see in the end is a division between the politics of change and of careerism, which explain the aforementioned rise as much as anything else. In the deep gorge between the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats, a number of camps have been struck, now come together to agree of their unwillingness to agree even over this simple fact: That politics is now dead, and that the age of theatrics is to remain - even after the de-demonisation of the latter which is as inevitable as that of the former - is not a sweeter dish than the great narrative of a struggle against the supreme bespectacled evil. Isolation is a currency of substantial worth in a , but it is now quickly being depreciated (or rather inflated by the expansion of this stratagem in a transition of sniper to mass shooter) while the value of the Sweden Democratic bloc has and will continue to rise - until it is empowered and tasked with ruling the people it has so dearly pledged itself to serve, and which it most certainly entirely loves or entirely hates. A test for any good man of prowess, deep-rooted knowledge and exercise in self-control.

Most annoyingly, to certain liberals including the aforementioned author is the level of hypocrisy, so exorbitantly exhibited, in the transition through (not from) the previous state of ignorance, denial, through many shades of anger to gradual acceptance and bargain to a point where - if there is not to be an agreement between the long-dreaded Labour Party, the cause of conservative-liberal unity (and subsequent hegemony) in the first place - an agreement can be made over the cordon sanitaire, lest it will be have to be broken in a painful cultural shift. The maintenance of a culture of theatrics in this brave new politics is certainly a fact, whilst predictable, does not deserve the epithet annoying. That the grander shift in the paradigm, if not entirely in the discourse, has succeeded a long period of chicken race against this shift, rather than made possible by the pressing presence of this ahistoric third bloc, has certainly not increased the confidence in its adaption or the attempt to fuse liberal doctrine and pathos with hard authoritarian, if largely impotent countermeasures.

With this adaption appearing more and more a question of another generation, if not part of a global attempt to control the assailable but fundamentally irresistible flow of migrants from an impoverished and increasingly unstable south to a relatively impoverished and increasingly unstable north, soon to be reconfirmed by an ever-unstable European Union; more so, if Britain were to reclaim its place. In reaction to the reaction itself to these challenges, the liberal centre-"far right" (in the old order of things) contenders have posed an extreme lack of enthusiastic vision, bold ideas and - above all - confidence.

The unlikely support group. But possible in a centre-left united in a paradigm of democratic oligarchy, foremost defined in its extreme reactiveness. But, as Napoleon said, the one on the defensive, immersed in conserving the present from within his fortress, is sure to be beaten no matter how comfortable - or necessary - the seat may seem. What victories will they claim? How much will they accomplish? Will the coalition spanning from far right to far left (in the old language) prove a last psalm for the old republic, or the beginning of a Dutch order of colourful blocs of the old Swedish principle, rule by consensus and outside-the-tent approval?

Let us examine, briefly, the history of the two parties jointly composing the new "liberal" bloc, between the traditional left and right, and the fourth pole in a previously sustainable, albeit unstable three poles system that followed almost immediately upon the alignment among two, and the affirmation of party politics in the majority and of a broader spectrum of seven... now eight... unlikely to change drastically in the face of aggrieved voters, a fact reinforced by the fact, not sad in itself but perhaps the saddest of this election, that all (if barely) clung to their seats, while amongst the oft-spoken outsiders none came even close, and the proposed true contender, the Sweden Democrats, once and future king on an apocalyptic mission to salvage Swedish civilisation - symbiotic in this aspect - was reduced to near naught after a bitterly unfought campaign by many unsung heroes under a hydra unfit to either designate a leader or replace them. And, it may be said, a glaring lack of interest, at least among the traditional media networks, which was key in the party's 2014 near-triumph.

The blatant absurdity that one may, from a starting point of great ostracism and scarce resources conquer three in every hundred voters and still want for any representation is a fact crafted for no dignified composure, and its equally unsung proposition that the alternative is fragmentation and chaos has proven itself as absurd as the old, and rather undemocratic maxim that certain numerical standards must be upheld... lest the worst among us will be let into the halls of power. However you may wish to design an electoral system, it cannot be on the basis that a particular actor should be excluded or reduced - fear that actual proportional representation would deign the Sweden Democrats a seat in this assembly. As for now they stand at better seat than vote tally, as is the granted custom. A better remedy, and my alteration - and altercation) of choice, would be to remove this threshold - indeed, of all thresholds - and create a national constituency, above all forcing existing actors to fight on the basis of the best program, rather than being the puny, miserable least offensive of the seven - I mean eight - currently in existence, for all intents and purposes.

The question now is the same as before the election: Which shift is first to occur. Either the full split in the centre-right, as fully fictional as the presumed unity of liberals or liberal thought, with a liberal bloc forming the fourth pole, in a new (and certain uneasy) coalition with, and soon within the broad left, highlighted ironically with their enmity against or the continued fealty of these parties in submission to an equally untried, but more formidable alliance between the "true" liberal opposition this new and impervious hard right. In the case the Liberals alone remaining, seemingly more content with the latter, it will not suffice. The initiative is thus entirely with the Centre Party, which faces the terrifying conundrum of a double lock of two negative votes and two more or less explicit promises, both of which cannot be continued to be honoured, if a government is to be formed. Broken promises are easily forgotten, but not always the men - and women - who disgraced themselves with the conduct. Chairman Lööf, unless a personality change is to occur, is unlikely to come out of this coalition washed free of chicanery, with the stoutness of a stateswoman.

It is, with this said, crucial to analyse the structural rather than ideological tenets within the liberal bloc preventing this realignment from coming into full fruition, rather descending into a deadbeat force certain to lose, and perhaps be erased upon an otherwise inescapable fresh election. As it stands, the left - in this sense including the centre-liberal parties - has been reduced to a state of being entirely reactive, formulating policy directly in opposition, rather than alternative to the Sweden Democrats and an emerging "conservative bloc". The realignment into a permanent centre-liberal "left", facing scant opposition from an aggrieved but reluctantly reluctant Left Party and half-growling conservative parties backing a hard-conservative pitbull, would destroy Swedish liberalism in so far that liberal voters would have to force their own realignment either to this opposition, with its potential of an economically liberal policy but being dead as a liberal bloc, or with the Social Democratic (yes, and -green) government.

If this is the future of Swedish liberalism, then Swedish liberalism is all but dead. Confused and battered and - perhaps the worst thing - unable to face its prospects to govern or perish, it has capitulated its responsibility. Solemn opposition, and the decided call for fresh elections, or perhaps more groundbreaking (be there shortly) reform of the system.

Another possible realignment could occur through the reinstatement, preferably with the Alternative Vote, of the long-abandoned one-member constituency voting system, and the subsequent rise of three electoral cartels; the Social Democrats, the liberal bloc, and a perceived, and then very real conservative bloc, with the Greens hanging onto either the first or the second, the left shattering (yet again) between scattered conscientious insignificance and re-joiners (and entryists), under the Social Democratic banner. In terms of electorate, these could enjoy roughly 30, 20 and 40 % of the vote respectively, suggesting - albeit it could well be wrong and underestimate, say, the rise of a strong left-populist party of 28/54 % vote/seat projection - why this change would likely be a dangerous step - lest the motives of current politicians are to derail the system under which they have prospered. It may be too late for such extreme measures to be effective to the purpose, if not too late to see them enacted.

So aside from this game changer, what reforms can be hoped for? I would, in an attempt at conservatism, propose the one mentioned: The elimination of the 1/25 threshold discussed to the point of nausea. It would almost certainly wreak havoc, but slower deaths upon those of failure who may as well face death in the 2020 election (or sooner than that) and the reinvigoration of an increasingly oligarchic system befitting the center-liberal parties less than others, and the introduction of a new not entirely defined by the great dark Other, born amidst raised arms and hooters of lampposts and those of the mosaic faith. This could, in itself, herald a liberal renewal, but would in itself spell a revitalisation of the democratic system ostensibly so beloved by liberal politicians. As it stands, this proposal is unlikely to be awakened, but may in the case of the declining Liberal Party spell its own - brief - salvation. Thus a lot to be gained, and perhaps a majority to be formed - if not from their new senior parter - leaving asides than the utilitarian argument often heard since the last American election, of making "every vote count". This would make as good an election promise and "single-issue" as any, and for all its dastard self-interest make even this disgruntled writer consider strongly the liberal ballot, now restored in name to its democratic roots, and if not wrinkle my forehead and see it go out finally with a pang of righteousness, truly deserved.

Fatal breakage? Now and then, a picture so apt - however feeble and unmajestic - as to shatter the illusions of a "grander" past, and readmit our understanding of the future. How will this image, heralding a (long-heralded) end to the 14-year matrimony, seem in another 14 years? Who, in terms of their offices, will not be there? Whose expressions will by then have been vindicated?